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Abstract—We consider a wiretap channel and use previously
transmitted messages to generate a secret key which increases the
secrecy capacity. This can be bootstrapped to increase the secrecy
capacity to the Shannon capacity without using any feedback or
extra channel while retaining the strong secrecy of the wiretap
channel.
Index Terms—Secret key, Physical Layer Security, Secrecy
Capacity.
I. INTRODUCTION
Shannon in 1948 in his seminal paper [17] considered the
problem of secure communication where he assumed that
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper receive the same
information. Wyner [18] assumed that the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper receive different information due to
channel differences and hence provided a coding scheme
which achieves secrecy without using a key. In [4] the authors
studied the Broadcast channel with a secret message in a more
general setting. The first work on secret key generation is
reported in [15]. In this paper the authors assume a public
discussion channel for exchanging functions, and then to agree
on a key. The eavesdropper “hears” the whole conversation. [1]
discusses two types of models: Source type model and Channel
type model. Secret key generation with multiple terminals was
studied in [5].
Secret key generation via the sources and channels was
investigated in [6] and[16].
Wiretap channel with rate-distortion has been studied in
[19]. In [7] the authors have considered the wiretap channel
with secure rate limited feedback. This feedback is used to
agree on a secret key. Wiretap channel with shared key was
studied in [12].
Strong secrecy based secret key agreement was introduced
in [14]. For a detailed survey of Information theoretic security
reader can refer to [13]. A Slow fading Wiretap channel with
a secret key buffer was studied in [9]. The authors study the
scenario where different secret messages are being transmitted
in different slots and consider the equivocation of a message
with only the outputs of the channel to the eavesdropper in the
same slot. In [10] the authors compute the equivocation of each
message with the outputs of the channel to the eavesdropper
in all these slots considered.
In this paper we study a model in which multiple messages
are being transmitted by Alice in different slots. The equivoca-
tion of the messages in a slot is computed with all the channel
Fig. 1. The Wiretap channel
outputs to the eavesdropper, as in [10]. In the first slot Alice
transmits a codeword using wiretap coding, as in [18]. Only
Bob can decode this message but not the eavesdropper. Thus,
in the next slot, we can use this message as a key to transmit
the next message and also use wiretap coding. This increases
the secret message rate to twice the secrecy capacity of the
wire-tap channel. This whole message can be used as a key
for the next slot. This we repeat till we achieve the secret key
rate equal to the capacity of the main channel, and then the
rest of the communication takes place using secret key at that
rate. We will show that this does not increase the information
leakage rate to eve.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Channel
model and the problem statement are provided in Section II. In
Section III we provide our coding and decoding scheme and
show that it can provide Shannon capacity without sacrificing
secrecy. In Section IV we apply our coding scheme on a
Gaussian wiretap channel. Section V concludes this paper.
A note about the notation: capital letters, like W will
denote a random variable and the corresponding small letter
w its realization. An n-length vector (A1, A2, . . . , An)will be
denoted as An. Information theoretic notation will be same as
in [8].
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider a discrete time, memoryless, degraded wiretap
channel, where Alice wants to transmit messages to Bob. There
is an eavesdropper (Eve) who is passively “listening”(Fig. 1).
We want to keep Eve ignorant of the messages.
Formally, Alice wants to communicate messages W ∈ W =
{1, 2, . . . , 2nRs} reliably over the Wiretap channel to Bob,
while ensuring that Eve is not able to decode them. Here Rs
is the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel defined as
Rs = max
p(x)
[I(X ;Y )− I(X ;Z)] . (1)
We assume Rs > 0. The transition probability matrix of the
channel is p(y, z|x). At time i, Xi is the channel input and the
legitimate receiver (Bob) and Eve receive the channel outputs
Yi and Zi respectively, where Xi ∈ X , Yi ∈ Y, Zi ∈ Z .
The messages Wk are generated uniformly from W and
{Wm,m ≥ 1} is an independent sequence. One or more
message is encoded into an n length codeword. A mini-slot
consists of n channel uses. In our scheme, the first slot consists
of only one mini-slot. Then upto λ slots, each slot consists of
2 mini-slots where
λ ,
[
C
Rs
]
, (2)
and C is the capacity of Alice-Bob channel and [x] is the
integer part of x. For simplicity, we take C
Rs
as integer. Finally,
after λ slots each slot has only one mini-slot. The message Wk
to be transmitted in slot k consists of one or more messages
Wm. The codeword for message W k (for 1 < k ≤ λ) is
denoted by X2nk = {Xk1, . . . , X2kn} or Xnk depending on the
length of the slot. To increase the secrecy rate, the transmitter
uses the secret message W k transmitted in slot k as the key
for transmitting the message in slot k + 1.
A. Encoder:
To transmit message W k+1 in slot k + 1, the encoder has
two parts
fs :W → X
n, fd :W ×K → X
n, (3)
where X ∈ X , and K is the set of secret keys generated and fs
is the Wiretap encoder, as in [18]. For fd one can use various
encoders studied for transmission with secret key. We use the
following: Take binary version of the message and XOR with
the binary version of the key. Encode the resulting encrypted
message with an optimal usual channel encoder.
In the first slot, a message is encoded using the wiretap
code only. From second slot onwards (till slot λ), both wiretap
encoder fs and deterministic encoder fd are used. Thus in
slot k, we can say that k messages from W are sent, 1 using
wiretap coding and k − 1 using a key of rate (k − 1)Rs. Of
course the overall coding rate should not exceed capacity C of
the main channel (Alice → Bob). After slot λ only one mini-
slot is used with a key of rate C (assuming C is multiple of
Rs, otherwise the key rate will be
[
C
Rs
]
Rs).
Decoder
For the first slot of communication, the decoder function at
Bob is
φ1 : Y
2n →W . (4)
From second slot onwards, the decoder also has a secret key
(which is generated in the previous slot). Thus, the decoder is
φi : Y
n ×K →Wj (5)
for time slot i, with j = min(i, C
Rs
). The probability of error
for this code is:
P (n)e = Pr{Ŵ 6= W} (6)
where Ŵ is the decoded message.
Leakage rate is RnL = 1nI(W ;Z
2n). This is the rate at
which information is getting leaked to Eve.
Definition 1: A Leakage-rate pair (RL, R) is said to be
achievable if there exists a sequence of (2nR, n)-codes such
that P (n)e → 0 and lim supn→∞RnL ≤ RL as n → ∞.
Actually in slot k ≥ 2 we will consider the leakage rate
1
2nI(Wm;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 , . . . , Z
2n
k ).
We will be concerned about the rate achievable when RL =
0.
III. CAPACITY OF WIRETAP CHANNEL
Theorem 3.1: The rate (0, C) is achievable for all slots k ≥
λ.
Proof of Achievability: In the first slot of communication, Alice
picks message W1 from W and transmits this message using
(n, 2nRs)-Code. Bob decodes this message as Ŵ1.
In the second slot using the previous message, W 1 = W1,
as a key (with key rate Rk = Rs) Alice transmits message
W 2 = (W21,W22), where W21 = W2,W22 = W3 are taken
from the iid sequence {Wk, k ≥ 1}. To transmit this message,
we use the following coding strategy:
The first message W21 is encoded to Xn21 using wiretap code.
The second message W22 is first encrypted to produce the
cipher using one-time pad with the previous message as secret
key, i.e., K = W1 and the cipher is W˜22 = W22
⊕
W1.
We encode this encrypted message to Xn22 using a point-to-
point optimal channel code, to transmit it over the channel
(practically, one can use LDPC or Turbo Codes). Hence
the overall codeword that is transmitted over the channel is
Xn21X
n
22 = X
2n
2 with the overall rate Rs.
In slot 3, W 3 = (W31,W32) is transmitted where W31 =
W4 and W32 is (W5,W6), i.e., W32 consists of two messages
from W . W31 is encoded as Xn31 using wiretap coding. W32 is
encoded via the key W 2: Using usual optimal channel code at
rate 2Rs, encode W 2
⊕
W32, provided of course 2Rs < C.
We continue this till λ− 1 slots. In slot λ− 1, we transmit
message (Wλ−1,1,Wλ−1,2, . . . ,Wλ−1,λ−1). We will use the
previous message (Wλ−2,2, . . . ,Wλ−2,λ−2) as the key with
the key rate Rk = (λ − 1)Rs. Message Wλ−1,1 is sent via
wiretap coding and the rest via the secret key. Now we achieve
the total rate,
1
2
(Rs + (λ− 1)Rs) =
1
2
(Rs + C) . (7)
In the next slot we will only have n channel uses and use only
the key with rate C and no wiretap coding. This provides us the
secret rate of C. From then onward we repeat this codebook
with the key as the previous message and obtain a secrecy rate
of C.
Bob decodes the message as follows. In slot k, (for 1 <
k < λ) Y nk1 is decoded via usual wiretap decoding while Y nk2
is decoded first by the channel decoder and then XORed with
Ŵk−1. The probability of error for Bob goes to zero as n→
∞. There is a small issue of error propagation due to using
the previous message as key: Let ǫn be the message error
probability for the wiretap encoder and let δn be the message
error probability due to the channel encoder for Wk . Then
ǫn → 0 and δn → 0 as n → ∞. For the kth slot, 1 <
k < λ − 1, we have P (W k 6= Ŵk) ≤ Pr(Error in decoding
Wk1) + Pr(Error in decoding W˜k2) + Pr(Error in decoding
W k−1) ≤ kǫn + (k − 1)δn. Thus the error increases with k.
But restarting (as in slot 1) after some k slots (somewhat large
compared to λ) as in slot 1 will ensure that P (W k 6= Ŵk)→ 0
as n→∞.
Next we compute the leakage rate for Eve. In slot 1, wire-
tap coding is used. Therefore, 1
n
I(W 1;Z
n
1 ) → 0, as n →
∞. In the following we fix an ǫ > 0 and take n such that
I(W 1;Z
n
1 ) ≤ nǫ.
In slot 2 we want to show that
1
n
I(W 1;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 )→ 0 (8)
and
1
n
I(W 2;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 )→ 0, (9)
as n→∞. We have,
I(W 1;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 ) = I(W 1;Z
n
1 ) + I(W 1;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ). (10)
Since W 2 = (W21,W22
⊕
W 1) ⊥ W 1, Z
2n
2 ⊥ (W 1, Z
n
1 )
(X ⊥ Y will denote X is independent of Y ). Therefore,
I(W 1;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ) = 0. (11)
Also, I(W 1;Zn1 ) ≤ nǫ and hence
I(W 1;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 ) ≤ nǫ. (12)
Next consider
I(W 2;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 )
= I(W 2;Z
n
1 ) + I(W 2;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ). (13)
Since W 2 ⊥ Zn1 , I(W 2;Zn1 ) = 0. Now consider the second
term in (13),
I(W 2;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ) = I(W21,W22;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 )
= I(W21;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ) + I(W22;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ,W21). (14)
Also,
I(W21;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 )
= I(W21;Z
n
22|Z
n
1 ) + I(W21;Z
n
21|Z
n
1 , Z
n
22). (15)
Since W21 ⊥ (Zn22, Zn1 ),
I(W21;Z
n
22|Z
n
1 ) = 0. (16)
Furthermore, (W21, Zn21) ⊥ (Zn1 , Zn22), implies
I(W21;Z
n
21|Z
n
1 , Z
n
22) = I(W21;Z
n
21) ≤ nǫ. (17)
From (15), (16) and (17)
I(W21;Z
2n
22 |Z
n
1 ) ≤ nǫ. (18)
Now we consider second term of (14),
I(W22;Z
2n
2 |Z
n
1 ,W21) = I(W22;Z
n
21, Z
n
22|Z
n
1 ,W21)
= I(W22;Z
n
21|Z
n
1 ,W21) + I(W22;Z
n
22|Z
n
1 , Z
n
21,W21).
(19)
Since W22 ⊥ (Zn21, Zn1 ,W21),
I(W22;Z
n
21|Z
n
1 ,W21) = 0.
Also (Zn21,W21) ⊥ (W22, Zn22, Zn1 ), implies,
I(W22;Z
n
22|Z
n
21, Z
n
1 ,W21) = I(W22;Z
n
22|Z
n
1 ). (20)
But W22 ⊥ Zn1 implies
I(W22;Z
n
22|Z
n
1 ) = I(W22;Z
n
1 , Z
n
22)
= I(W22;Z
n
22) + I(W22;Z
n
1 |Z
n
22)
= I(W22;Z
n
1 |Z
n
22), (21)
because I(W22;Zn22) = 0. Now observe that the following
Markov relationship holds
Zn1 ←→W1 ←→ (W1,W22)←→ Z
n
22. (22)
Therefore,
I(Zn1 ;W22|Z
n
22) ≤ I(Z
n
1 ;W22,W1|Z
n
22) ≤ I(Z
n
1 ;W22,W1)
= I(Zn1 ;W1) + I(Z
n
1 ;W22|W1). (23)
Because of wiretap coding I(Zn1 ;W1) ≤ nǫ. Also from (22),
I(Zn1 ;W22|W1) = 0.
Hence,
I(Zn1 ;W22|Z
n
22) ≤ nǫ. (24)
Along with (18), this implies that I(W 2;Zn1 , Z2n2 ) ≤ 2nǫ.
Next we use mathematical induction to show that
1
n
I(Wm;Z
n
1 , Z
2n
2 , . . . , Z
2n
k+1)→ 0 for all m ≤ k + 1, k ≥ 1.
We use the notation,
Z(m) = (Zn1 , Z
2n
2 , . . . , Z
2n
m ), m = 1, 2, . . . (25)
We show
1
n
I(Wm;Z
(k+1)) ≤ 2ǫ, (26)
for m = 1, . . . k + 1 given,
1
n
I(Wm;Z
(k)) ≤ 2ǫ, (27)
for m = 1, . . . , k.
For m = 1, . . . k,
I(Wm;Z
(k+1)) = I(Wm;Z
(k))+ I(Wm;Z
2n
k+1|Z
(k)). (28)
From (27) I(Wm;Z(k)) ≤ nǫ.
The second term,
I(Wm;Z
2n
k+1|Z
(k))
= I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,1, Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k))
= I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k)) + I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k), Znk+1,1).
(29)
Also,
I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k)) = I(Wm1,Wm2;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k))
= I(Wm1;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k))
+ I(Wm2;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k),Wm1). (30)
Now since (Wm1, Zk+1,1) ⊥ Z(k),
I(Wm1;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k)) = I(Wm1;Zk+1,1) = 0. (31)
Next consider the second term of (30),
I(Wm2;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k),Wm1). Since Znk+1,1 ⊥ (Z(k),Wm),
I(Wm2;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k),Wm1) = 0. (32)
Hence from (30), (31) and (32), we get
I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k)) = 0. (33)
Now we consider
I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k), Znk+1,1), m = 1, . . . , k.
When m = k the following Markov relation holds,
(Z(k), Znk+1,1)↔ (Wk1,Wk2)
↔ (Wk1,Wk2,Wk+1,2)↔ Z
n
k+1,2. (34)
Thus, by Markov inequality,
I(W k;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k), Znk+1,1) ≤ I(Wk1,Wk2;Z
n
k+1,2)
= I(Wk2;Z
n
k+1,2) = 0. (35)
Therefore from (28), we get I(W k;Z(k+1)) ≤ nǫ. Now
for m < k, since Z(m−1) ⊥ (Wm, Z2nk+1, Z2nm , . . . , Z2nk ), we
have
I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k), Znk+1,1)
= I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
2n
m , . . . Z
2n
k , Z
n
k+1,1). (36)
From the following Markov relation
(Z2nm , . . . , Z
2n
k , Z
n
k+1,1)↔ (Wm,Wm+1, ...,W k+1)↔ Z
n
k+1,2,
(37)
we get
I(Wm;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
2n
m , . . . , Z
2n
k , Z
n
k+1,1)
≤ I(Wm,Wm+1, . . . ,W k+1;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
2n
m , . . . , Z
2n
k , Z
2
k+1,1)
≤ I(Wm,Wm+1, . . . ,W k;Z
n
k+1,2) = 0. (38)
Thus we obtain
I(Wm;Z
(k+1)) ≤ nǫ, (39)
for m = 1, . . . , k.
Now consider
I(W k+1;Z
(k+1)) = I(Wk+1,1,Wk+1,2;Z
(k+1))
= I(Wk+1,1;Z
(k+1)) + I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k+1)|Wk+1,1). (40)
We consider the first term of (40),
I(Wk+1,1;Z
(k+1))
= I(Wk+1,1;Z
(k)) + I(Wk+1,1;Z
2n
k+1|Z
(k)). (41)
Since Wk+1,1 ⊥ (Zn1 , . . . , Z2nk ),
I(Wk+1,1;Z
(k)) = 0. (42)
Also,
I(Wk+1,1;Z
2n
k+1|Z
(k))
= I(Wk+1,1;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k)) + I(Wk+1,1;Z
n
k+1,1|Z
(k), Znk+1,2)
= 0 + nǫ. (43)
Thus,
I(Wk+1,1;Z
(k+1)) ≤ nǫ. (44)
Now we consider second term in (40),
I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k+1)|Wk+1,1)
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k), Znk+1,1, Z
n
k+1,2|Wk+1,1)
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,1|Wk+1,1)
+ I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k), Znk+1,2|Wk+1,1, Z
n
k+1,1). (45)
Since Wk+1,2 ⊥ (Wk+1,1, Znk+1,1),
I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,1|Wk+1,1) = 0.
Also we note that (Wk+1,1, Znk+1,1) ⊥ (Wk+1,2, Z(k), Znk+1,2)
and Wk+1,2 ⊥ Z(k) and hence (45) becomes
I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k), Znk+1,2|Wk+1,1, Z
n
k+1,1)
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k), Znk+1,2)
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
(k)) + I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k))
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k)). (46)
Also since Z(k−1) ⊥ (Wk+1,2, Znk+1,2, Z2nk ),
I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
(k)) = I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
2n
k ). (47)
But Wk+1,2 ⊥ Z2nk implies
I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2|Z
2n
k ) = I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2, Z
2n
k )
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
n
k+1,2) + I(Wk+1,2;Z
2n
k |Z
n
k+1,2)
= I(Wk+1,2;Z
2n
k |Z
n
k+1,2). (48)
Now note that the following Markov relationship holds
Z2nk ←→ W k ←→ (W k,W k+1,2)←→ Z
2n
k+1,2 (49)
and also Wk+1,2 ⊥ (W k, Z2nk ). Therefore,
I(Wk+1,2;Z
2n
k |Z
n
k+1,2) ≤ I(Wk+1,2W k;Z
2n
k |Z
n
k+1,2)
≤ I(Wk+1,2,W k;Z
2n
k )
≤ I(W k;Z
2n
k ) + I(Wk+1,2;Z
2n
k |W k) ≤ nǫ+ 0. (50)
From (40) and (44), now we obtain
I(W k+1;Z
(k+1)) ≤ 2nǫ.  (51)
Comment: We can obtain Shannon capacity even with strong
secrecy. To do that we have to use information reconciliation
and privacy amplification in the first slot after transmitting
message W 1 using wiretap coding, as is done in [14] and [3].
In the subsequent blocks we use both the wiretap encoder and
the deterministic encoder. Wiretap encoder is used to trans-
mit one message using wiretap coding and the deterministic
encoder is used for transmitting the other message (which
is encrypted with the secret key generated in strong secure
sense in the previous slot) using usual channel codes. Here
also we need to modify the wiretap encoder by incorporating
information reconciliation and privacy amplification for the
message which we transmit using wiretap code. In this way
we ensure that in every slot we generate the secret key for the
next slot which is strongly secure, i.e, in kth slot, we have
I(Wm;Z
n
1 , . . . , Z
2n
k )→ 0,m = 1, . . . , k. (52)
Proof of (52) follows as in Theorem 3.1
IV. EXAMPLES
A. Gaussian Wiretap Channel
Consider Additive White Gaussian Noise Channel (AWGN)
wiretap channel with average power constraint P . The noise
variance at Bob and Eve are σ2b and σ2e respectively, with σ2b <
σ2e . The channel codes are chosen from Gaussian codebooks
as X ∼ N (0, P ). Then, from [11]
Rs =
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2b
)
−
1
2
log
(
1 +
P
σ2e
)
. (53)
The key rate RK in slot 2 is Rs, in slot 3 is 2Rs and so on.
After slot λ, where
λ =
1
2 log
(
1 + P
σ2
b
)
1
2 log
(
1 + P
σ2
b
)
− 12 log
(
1 + P
σ2
e
) , (54)
the capacity will reach 12 log
(
1 + P
σ2
b
)
provided C
Rs
is integer
valued.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have achieved secrecy rate equal to the
main channel capacity by using previous secret messages as
key for transmitting the current message. This can be done
while still retaining strong secrecy.
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